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Abstract
We implement a gym-attendance incentive intervention and elicit subjects’
predictions of their post-intervention attendance. We find that subjects greatly
over-predict future attendance, which we interpret as evidence of partial naivete´
with respect to present bias. We find a significant post-intervention attendance
increase, which we interpret as habit formation, and which subjects appear not
to predict ex-ante. These results are consistent with a model of projection bias
with respect to habit formation. Neither the intervention incentives, nor the
small post-treatment incentives involved in our elicitation mechanism, appear
to crowd out existing intrinsic motivation. The combination of naivete´ and
projection bias in gym attendance can help explain limited take-up of commit-
ment devices by dynamically inconsistent agents, and points to new forms of
contracts. Alternative explanations of our results are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Individuals routinely make intertemporal decisions which require them to predict
how their preferences, beliefs, and constraints will change over time. For example,
if a person is deciding today whether to put off until tomorrow an unpleasant task
with long-term benefits, it matters whether they correctly predict their ability to
resist the same temptation tomorrow. If not, they may procrastinate at a potentially
unbounded welfare cost (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Similarly, if a person is
deciding today whether to invest time in a habit-forming activity, it matters whether
they predict how habit-forming it will be, both when the habit is a tempting but
harmful one, such as drug addiction, or a salutary one, such as a life-enhancing
health behavior (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003). Moreover, a principal
designing a behavior-change incentive scheme must take into consideration whether
agents’ predictions satisfy rational expectations.
Identifying systematic misprediction of future behavior in the real world has
proven challenging. We build upon a field-experimental intervention, which has
previously been shown to exogenously induce what has been interpreted as a gym-
attendance habit, to explore whether subjects predict the apparent habit formation
process or whether they instead exhibit projection bias with respect to this change
in their preferences, as defined by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003). Us-
ing the same framework, we are also able to explore subjects’ predictions of future
time preference, i.e. whether they are “naive” or “sophisticated” with respect to self-
control problems caused by present bias, as defined by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
Finally, our experimental design allows us to offer some suggestive evidence about the
countervailing phenomena of habit formation and crowding out of intrinsic motivation
in the presence of small incentives.
We take advantage of the experimental intervention of Charness and Gneezy
(2009) (hereafter CG), who paid treatment-group subjects $100 to attend the gym
eight times in one month, and found an increase in post-treatment attendance com-
pared to a control group, which they interpret as habit formation – ruling out long-
term crowding-out of intrinsic motivation.1 We recruit 120 subjects, and replicate
1That habit formation plays an important role in physical exercise has long been accepted in
the behavioral health literature. See for example, Valois, Dersharnais and Godin (1988), Dzewal-
towski, Noble and Shaw (1990), Reynolds, Killen, Bryson, Maron, Taylor, Maccoby and Farquhar
(1990), Godin, Valois and Lepage (1993), Godin (1994), but Charness and Gneezy (2009) is the first
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CG’s main gym-attendance intervention. Using this intervention as a means to in-
duce an exogenous shift in gym-attendance preferences, we build it into a larger ex-
perimental framework to explore whether subjects predict such a shift. Specifically,
we elicit subjects’ predictions of post-treatment attendance, eliciting both immedi-
ately before the intervention (but one week after subjects learned of the intervention)
and then again immediately after the intervention. Our elicitations consist of both
an incentive-compatible valuation of a contingent-payment contract for future gym
attendance, and an un-incentivized direct prediction task.
We find a significant post-treatment gym-attendance increase of 0.188 visits per
week among our subjects, which is smaller than, but statistically indistinguishable
from, CG’s result. Thus, like CG, we find no evidence of long-term crowding out of
intrinsic motivation caused by the month-long treatment intervention, and like them
we interpret the increase in post-treatment attendance as habit formation, though we
discuss alternative explanations. Because we track subjects for longer than CG, we
can observe that the effect appears to largely decay during the semester break, sug-
gesting that this type of habit formation may be short-lived. Indeed, Kane, Johnson,
Town and Butler (2004) find that monetary incentives typically do not have long-run
effects that extend even as far as those we identify.
We find that the smaller incentives provided by the contingent-payment contracts
we use as part of our prediction-elicitation mechanism also result in increased atten-
dance for both treatment and control groups, with attendance monotonically increas-
ing in the size of the incentive. This suggests that smaller incentives (as low as $1
per visit) did not result in short-term crowding out. However, we find also that the
difference in post-treatment attendance between treated and control subjects disap-
pears in weeks when subjects held a contingent-payment contract. Given the small
number of weeks with these incentives, however, we cannot establish this result with
precision.
With respect to predictions, we find that on average treatment and control sub-
jects significantly over-predict their actual attendance, by a factor in the ranges of
2.5–5.5 for predictions made before the intervention, and 2–4 for those made after
the intervention. This result is consistent with at least partial naivete´ with respect to
future self-control problems caused by present bias: subjects fail to predict how their
future desire for immediate gratification will affect their gym attendance. Moreover,
experimental evidence we are aware of.
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comparing unincentivized and incentivized predictions, we find that subjects on aver-
age did not value being incentivized to go to the gym, providing another test of their
beliefs regarding self-control and demand for commitment. Also, we find that both
groups revise their predictions downwards after the treatment period. This was not
one of the hypotheses we set out to test, but as the initial predictions were at the
beginning of the semester, it can potentially be interpreted as an initial misprediction
of future time constraints. As we will show, our main misprediction results are robust
to this time trend in predictions.
Next we test whether treated subjects correctly predict the increase in post-
treatment attendance caused by the intervention. We compare the change over time
in treated subjects’ predictions to the change for control subjects. If, prior to the
intervention, treated subjects fully predicted the increase in their attendance relative
to control subjects, we would expect them to incorporate that increase into their
predictions both before and after the intervention, and thus the natural downward
revision in their predictions over time mentioned above would be the same as for con-
trol subjects, ceteris paribus. But if treated subjects at least partially failed to predict
the treatment effect, the downward revision in their predictions would be less than
for controls, because there would be an offsetting upward revision in their predictions
after the intervention, once they experienced the attendance increase caused by the
intervention. We find that treated subjects do revise downwards by less than control
subjects, by 0.421 visits per week in weeks where they did not receive an additional
contingent-payment incentive – a level not significantly different from the observed
treatment effect. This result is consistent with projection bias with respect to habit
formation. Interestingly, for weeks in which subjects received contingent-payment
contracts, treated subjects’ predictions do not differ from control subjects’ predic-
tions, either before or after the treatment period. We discuss potential explanations
of this result, including the possibility that the external incentives simply dominated
the treatment effect, making it statistically unobservable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the
design of our experiment. Section three presents our results on attendance and pre-
diction. Section four discusses our findings and concludes.
3
2 Design
We recruited 120 subjects from the students and staff of UC Berkeley and randomly
assigned them to treatment and control groups. Due to attrition and missing covari-
ates, our final sample includes 54 treated subjects and 57 control subjects.2 CG found
that habit formation was greatest among previous non-attenders, so we screened for
subjects who self-reported that they did not regularly attend any fitness facility, with
the intent that this would give us greater prevalence of habit formation, and thus
greater power to investigate predictions of habit formation. Subjects were unaware
that the experiment was related to exercise at the time of recruitment, and there is no
evidence that the subjects in our sample manipulated their answers to the screening-
mechanism in order to obtain eligibility. Based on the pre-treatment pattern of atten-
dance, the screening mechanism appears largely successful at eliminating “regular”
gym-goers. 48% never attended at all during the pre-treatment period, while 64%
did not have gym memberships at the start of the experiment. None of our subjects
had average weekly attendance as high as twice a week in the pre-treatment period,
and only 4 (3%) had average attendance of once a week. There is no difference in
the proportion of treatment and control subjects with non-zero pre-treatment atten-
dance. We explore the effect of pre-treatment attendance in appendix B.1. We paid
the $10 gym-membership fee for all subjects, filing the necessary membership forms
for those who were not already members, and reimbursing the fees of those who were.
2.1 Timeline, interventions, and predictions
Our intervention period was eleven weeks long, and began with the second full week
of the fall semester of 2008. In the first week of the intervention period—the “learning
week”—both groups received $25 if they visited the campus gym one time, in order
to make sure all subjects overcame any one-time fixed cost of initial gym attendance
such as learning how to get to the gym, or how to find the locker room, etc. In this
way we hoped to separate true habit formation, resulting from multiple visits, from
any increase in post-treatment attendance that might be caused by simply having
2Four treated and two control subject dropped out of the study. An additional two treated
and one control subjects had missing data. The difference in attrition and missing data between
treatment and control is not statistically significant. Unfortunately, because demographic variables
were collected at the third session, we cannot compare attriters across groups. Details of the sample
and comparisons of treated and control subjects appear in appendix A.1.
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overcome fixed costs. During the subsequent four weeks – the “treatment month” –
subjects in the treatment group received $100 if they visited the gym twice-weekly,
for a total of eight visits. The learning-week offer is identical to the low-incentive
condition of CG, so our control group corresponds to their low-incentive group, while
our treatment group is almost identical to their high-incentive group. Our design
required two visits per week, theirs eight in a month. We hoped this change would
limit the potential for procrastination so that naive present-biased subjects in the
treatment group would be more likely to meet the eight-visit threshold. Our compli-
ance rate was not distinguishable from that under CG’s less-restrictive design. The
treatment month was followed by a buffer of one week, after which there were five
“target weeks,” for which subjects made attendance predictions, as described below.
Gym attendance was tracked using card-swipe data.
During the course of the intervention period, subjects were convened for three
meetings with researchers: on the first day of the learning week, on the first day
of the treatment month, and on the first day of the buffer week. For manageabil-
ity, each group was broken into two sessions at each meeting, with treatment and
control group sessions staggered over the course of an afternoon. To minimize attri-
tion, a participation payment of $25 was given for attending the first meeting, and
another of equal size for attending both of the subsequent meetings. In addition, sub-
jects were reminded of each session by email. At the first session, the learning-week
offer was announced to all subjects and the treatment-month offer was announced
to treatment-group subjects. In addition, subjects were asked to complete a ques-
tionnaire. At the second meeting subjects were asked to complete a series of tasks
(described below) intended to elicit gym-attendance predictions for each of the five
target weeks. We refer to these as “first-elicitation” predictions. At the time of elici-
tation, both groups were reminded of the offers they had received the previous week.
At the third meeting, subjects were asked to complete the same set of tasks, to elicit
their “second-elicitation” predictions for the same five target weeks. Thus, we have
predictions of post-treatment target-week gym attendance from immediately before
(first elicitation) and immediately after (second elicitation) the treatment month. To
the extent that the treatment-month offer resulted in habit formation, these pre-
dictions can be thought of as being made before and after the state change from
non-habituated to habituated.3 Finally, at the end of the third meeting, subjects
3We recognize that there are other interpretations for any attendance effect of the treatment-
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Figure 1: Experimental Timeline
Buffer Week
Attendance Offers Announced
(Week=0)
Pre-Treatment Predictions
(Week=1) Treatment Month
($100 for 2 visits/wk,
8 visits total,
treated group only)
Pre-Treatment Period
(37 weeks)
Learning Week
($25 for 1 visit, both groups)
Target Weeks
(5 weeks)
Post-Treatment Predictions
(Week=5)
Treated Group Control Group
Remaining Post-Treatment Period 
(27 weeks)
Immediate Post-Treatment 
(8 weeks) 
Winter Break (4 weeks) 
Later Post-Treatment
(21 weeks) 
were asked to complete an additional questionnaire. The timeline of the experiment
is illustrated in Figure 1. We discuss compliance with the treatment-month offer,
attrition, and our randomization procedure in Appendix A.2.
We announced our treatment-month offer at the initial meeting, one week be-
fore the first elicitation meeting, in order to provide treated subjects with time to
adapt to the prospect of earning an additional $100, before giving them an elicitation
task involving uncertain monetary payoffs (see below). The buffer week was inserted
between the treatment month and the target weeks so that present-biased subjects
would view the first target week as being in the future from the perspective of the
second elicitation meeting, in an attempt to eliminate any difference between first-
and second-elicitation predictions that might have been caused by naive present bias.
month offer, and we address these alternatives in subsequent sections.
6
We are able to confirm that this succeeded in the results section.
Gym attendance data were collected for a 17-month period stretching from 37
weeks before the learning week to 27 weeks after the end of the fifth target week. This
period includes summer and winter academic breaks as well as three full semesters.
We used administrative data on ID-card swipes required for entrance to exercise
facilities and locker rooms. Because swipes were necessary to enter facilities but not
to exit, we cannot determine the length of a visit. Subjects were told that payments
were contingent upon “swiping in” at the gym and engaging in at least 30 minutes
of physical activity, but we were not able to observe gym activity, and subjects were
aware of this. We acknowledge that some of the recorded swipes during the treatment
month, or when holding a contingent-payment contract during the target weeks, may
represent subjects swiping to receive the reward but not exercising. However, there
would be no reason to continue to engage in such behavior when incentives were
absent during the post-treatment period. To the extent that some subjects may have
swiped without exercising during the treatment month, our test of habit formation is
biased downwards, i.e. against the habit-formation finding we report. Furthermore,
subjects who used the locker room in addition to exercise facilities, and are thus less
likely to have engaged in swiping without exercising, are identifiable in our data,
because they had to swipe into the locker room both before and after exercising, in
addition to swiping into the exercise facilities. Restricting analysis to this subset does
not appear to affect any of our results.
2.2 Elicitation procedures
Incentive-compatible elicitation of subjects’ predictions of their future behavior is
complicated by the fact that any scheme to incentivize truthful revelation will also
incentivize a change in the behavior being predicted. If subjects value the change in
their behavior caused by the incentive — for example, because the incentive helps
them overcome a self-control problem in gym attendance — it may further affect
their response to elicitation tasks. There is no accepted solution to this problem.
We use two strategies which, together, we believe give us a reasonably good claim
to have elicited predictions usefully, if not perfectly. The first strategy involves elic-
iting incentive-compatible valuations for a cash-reward certificate that functions as
a contingent-payment contract, the value of which is proportional to the number of
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gym visits during a future time period. The second involves simply asking subjects
how often they believe they would attend the gym during the specified time period
if they held such a certificate.
To implement these two strategies, we created a set of “Daily RSF-Reward Cer-
tificates,” each of which entitled the holder to a given number, p, of dollars for each
day they attended the campus gym (the “RSF”) during a given target week. For
conciseness we refer to these certificates hereafter as “p-coupons.” Figure 2 shows a
sample p-coupon, with p = 1. The value a subject places on a p-coupon is determined,
in part, by the number of times they believe they will visit the gym if they own the
coupon. There were five target weeks, and the parameter p took values of 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 7, so that the total number of different p-coupons was 35.4 At both the first and
second elicitation meetings, we presented each subject with a series of four p-coupons,
one for each of four target weeks, and asked them to complete a multiple-price-list
task to determine their dollar valuation for each of the coupons. Importantly, the
task was framed as a choice between the p-coupon and a fixed amount of money on
the maturity date of the p-coupon, which means that time discounting affects both
options equally and thus does not affect coupon valuations.5 By dividing a subject’s
willingness to pay for a coupon by its face value, p, we computed what we refer to
as the normalized coupon valuation, which is approximately how many times the
subject believes they will attend the gym during the specified target week under the
subsidy provided by the coupon. Presenting each subject with four p-coupons left
each subject with one target week for which they were not asked to value a coupon.
The value of p for each coupon, the week for which there was no coupon, and the
order of the target weeks for which the coupons were presented, were all randomized
across subjects, using a mechanism that ensured a predetermined number of coupons
for each value of p, each week, and each possible ordering, and the same distribution
in treatment as in control. Immediately after each multiple-price-list task, subjects
were asked to indicate the number of days they believed they would attend the gym
during the given target week, if they actually held the p-coupon for which they had
4We conducted a pilot of the elicitation mechanism to determine appropriate values for p.
5The task asked subjects to make a series of choices between a p-coupon and an incrementally
increasing fixed amount of money equal to an integer multiple of p. We infer their valuation from
the implied indifference point between the coupon and the fixed sum. Subjects were instructed that
at most one choice would be implemented, which preserves independent valuations across tasks. The
task is described in detail in Appendix B.2.
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Figure 2: A Sample “p-coupon”
 
This exercise involves nine questions, relating to the Daily RSF-Reward Certificate shown at the top of 
the page.  Each question gives you two options, A or B.  For each question check the option you prefer.   
You will be asked to complete this exercise four times, once each for four of the five target weeks.  The 
daily value of the certificate will be different for each of these four target weeks.  For one of the five 
weeks you will not be asked to complete this exercise. 
At the end of the session I’ll choose one of the five target weeks at random.  Then I’ll choose one of the 
nine questions at random.  Then I’ll choose one subject at random.  The randomly chosen subject will 
receive whichever option they checked on the randomly chosen question for the randomly chosen target 
week.  Thus, for each question it is in your interest to check the option you prefer. 
ȱ
 
 
 S M T W T F S
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OCT 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 
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DailyȱRSFȬRewardȱCertificate 
This certificate entitles the holder to 
$1 
for every day that he or she attends the RSF during the week 
of 
Monday, Oct 13 through Sunday, Oct 19. 
$1 $1 
$1 $1 
Notes: A p-coupon provides a small subsidy, p, for each gym visit during an indicated target week. Subjects were
asked to predict their subsidized attendance for p∈{1,2,3,5,7} (“unincentivized predictions”) and to give their dollar
valuation for the same set of coupons (“coupon valuations”). Most subjects ultimately received exactly one p-coupon.
just indicated their dollar valuation. We refer to these as unincentivized predictions.
To ensure that first- and second-elicitation predictions were comparable, we pre-
sented each subject with the same series of coupons, in the same order, in each of
the meetings. In addition, we selected, at random, only one subject to receive the
indicated payoff of only one of their multiple-price-list tasks. Thus, while maintain-
ing incentive compatibility, we minimized the number of instances in which a subject
would, at the second-elicitation meeting, be valuing a second p-coupon for a given
target week.6 At the time of the first elicitation, subjects did not know that the
second elicitation would take place. Thus, subjects’ first-elicitation valuations were
not confounded by uncertainty about possible future p-coupons. Also, subjects were
instructed that any payment they received as a consequence of their price-list choices
— either the payment from the p-coupon or the alternative fixed payment — would
be issued at the conclusion of the associated target week, so that both options would
be subject to the same intertemporal discounting.
Finally, at the end of the second elicitation meeting, after all of the elicitation tasks
had been completed, we gave each subject, to keep, one of the four coupons they had
been presented with during the elicitation process, selected at random.7 The giveaway
was a surprise to the subjects — having been conducted unannounced only after the
second round of elicitations was completed — and thus did not affect their p-coupon
valuations or unincentivized predictions during the elicitation tasks. We therefore
have two target weeks for each subject for which we can compare their actual gym
6In these few cases, predictions were simply assumed to be for attendance under the condition of
holding a coupon worth 2p, or subjects were dropped from the analysis.
7Here again we randomized in such a way as to ensure predetermined numbers of coupons for
each value of p, and for each target week, and the same distribution across groups.
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attendance with their predictions of attendance under the same attendance-incentive
conditions: the week for which they actually received a coupon, and the week where
no coupon was presented either for predictions or attendance.
The multiple-price-list task is incentive compatible for subjects’ valuations of the
p-coupons, but those valuations are affected by at least three factors in addition to
their gym-attendance prediction. The first is risk preference: in the face of uncertainty
about future preferences and future time and budget constraints, concavity of the
utility function for wealth (or of the value function in a reference-dependence model)
would lower the value of a p-coupon. The second factor is the time and effort cost of
gym-attendance, which we assume would be negative for all subjects, and would thus
also lower the value of a p-coupon. The third factor is the long-term health value of
the additional gym-attendance incentivized by a p-coupon. Present-biased subjects
who are at least partially sophisticated about their future self-control problems may
value the p-coupon as a device to increase the likelihood that their “future self” will
attend the gym, which would drive up the value of the coupon. It is possible that
this third term could dominate the second for sophisticated present-biased agents.
For simplicity, and because we have no way to distinguish them in our data, we
refer to the net value of effort cost and long-term health value accruing as a result
of p-coupon incentivized attendance as the net “commitment value” of a p-coupon.
Thus, care must be taken not to interpret subjects’ normalized valuations as exactly
proportional to their predictions. Our goal in designing the experiment was that
additionally asking subjects to directly predict their attendance under the conditions
created by holding a p-coupon would provide us with a second approach to eliciting
predictions, and that the combination of the two approaches would provide us with
useful information about predictions.
3 Results
Of the 54 subjects in our final treatment sample, 43 completed the eight necessary
semi-weekly visits in order to earn the $100 treatment-month incentive: a completion
rate of 80%. In CG’s high-incentive group the completion rate was approximately
83%, suggesting that our more restrictive semi-weekly requirement did not have a
substantial effect on subjects’ ability to make the required number of visits.
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3.1 Post-treatment attendance
Figure 3 shows average weekly attendance for the treatment and control groups over
the duration of the study period. In this and the related regression analysis reported
in the first three columns of Table 1, we have removed observations for each subject
for the target week in which they received a p-coupon in the giveaway, in order to
isolate the main effect of the treatment-month intervention from the effect of the
attendance subsidies provided by the coupons. The broad pattern of results is as
follows. In the pre-treatment period, attendance in the two groups moves together
tightly, as we would expect. In the treatment period, treated subjects attend much
more than control subjects, reflecting the effectiveness of our treatment-month in-
centive. In the immediate post-treatment period — the two months between the
end of the treatment period and the beginning of the semester break — the treated
group continues to attend the gym more than the control group. We follow CG in
interpreting this as supporting the hypothesis of habit formation, though we discuss
alternative explanations later in this section.
Figure 3: Gym Attendance
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Notes: Average weekly gym attendance, by treatment group status. Weeks in which a subject received a p-coupon
for attendance are omitted from this figure.
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During the four weeks of the semester break there is essentially no attendance
in either group. In the later post-treatment period – the four months after the
semester break – the difference between groups is greatly diminished, suggesting that
the attendance increase induced by four weeks of exogenous gym attendance largely
decayed over a similar-length period of quasi-exogenous non-attendance.
We estimate a linear difference-in-differences panel regression model to determine
if these patterns are statistically significant. Each observation in the panel is the
attendance of a specific individual on a specific week of the study, and we therefore
cluster all standard errors throughout by subject. We regress weekly gym attendance
on the interactions of the treatment-group dummy with dummies for the treatment
period and each of the two post-treatment periods. To increase the precision of our
analysis we include individual fixed effects.8 We regress the equation:
Attendanceit =γ1 ·Duringt + γ2 ·Duringt · TRi + γ3 · Postt + γ4 · Postt · TRi
+ γ5 · LatePostt + γ6 · LatePostt · TRi + µi + εit (1)
where Attendanceit is subject i’s attendance in week t; Duringt, Postt, and LatePostt
denote the intervention month, immediate post-treatment period, and later post-
treatment period respectively; and TRi indicates whether subject i is assigned to the
treatment group.
The results of this regression appear in the first column of Table 1. The coef-
ficient on the interaction of the treatment-group and treatment-period dummies is
1.449, roughly the product of the twice-weekly incentive target and the 80% compli-
ance rate, which reflects the strong effect of the $100 incentive on contemporaneous
attendance. The remaining two interaction terms tell us the effect of the treatment
on treatment-group attendance in the two post-treatment periods. The point esti-
mate is 0.188 additional visits per week for the immediate post-treatment period,
representing approximately a doubling of average attendance in our sample. In the
later post-treatment period, after the winter break, we see no statistically signifi-
cant difference between the groups, with a point estimate of 0.047 additional visits
per week. Restricting the immediate post-treatment period to the five target weeks
raises the effect on treated subjects to 0.228 visits in column (3), consistent with our
8We thus do not estimate the direct effect of treatment group assignment in the pre-treatment
period. In Appendix Table A.1, we confirm that there are no pre-existing differences.
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interpretation of a decaying habit.
Because not all treatment-group subjects made the requisite eight visits to the
gym, column (2) of Table 1 represents the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). We use the
treatment-group dummy to instrument for compliance using two-stage least squares
to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), controlling for base-
line differences in attendance. This analysis implicitly assumes there is no effect on
subjects who did not meet the 8-visit threshold, which is not implausible given that
such subjects averaged just two visits during the treatment month, and none went
as many as 7 times. These results are reported in the second column of Table 1,
where the increase in immediate post-treatment treatment-group attendance is now
just under one-quarter of a visit per week on average.
To compare our results with those from CG we show the results of running the
ITT regression on their data in the final column of Table 1.9 The double difference in
average weekly attendance between their high-incentive and low-incentive subjects in
the immediate post-treatment period was 0.640 visits per week.10 Stacking their data
with ours allows us to conduct a Chow test of the equality of their treatment-effect
coefficient with the one in our column-one specification. The p-value, reported in
square brackets, is 0.06. Thus, while we estimate a smaller effect, we do not reject
that the treatment effect was the same across studies.
Like CG we explore heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Our approach is to
repeat the analysis of Table 1, but to allow for an individual-specific treatment effect
during the immediate post-treatment period. We include individual fixed effects as
before, and thus our hypothesis is that the distribution of individual treatment ef-
fects among treated subjects will first-order stochastically dominate the distribution
among controls. We plot each distribution in Appendix Figure A.1, and it is clear on
inspection that the treatment group includes significantly more subjects with large in-
creases in gym attendance. A Mann-Whitney test rejects equality of the distributions
at p=0.048, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality at a stronger p=0.01.
Moreover, the distribution of habits among treated subjects appears bimodal, with
one group centered around zero change and another centered around an increase of
roughly 1 to 1.5 visits per week. In Appendix Table A.1, we find no significant pre-
9This specification differs from the one they report, which uses pre- and post-treatment averages
rather than the full panel of weeks. We thank CG for making their data available.
10Recall that our control group is equivalent to their low-incentive group.
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Table 1: Effect of Treatment and P-coupons on Average Weekly Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (CG)
During 0.128** 0.128** 0.128** 0.128** 0.128** 0.222**
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.103)
Post 0.060 0.060 0.101 0.131* 0.101 0.054
(0.058) (0.057) (0.064) (0.074) (0.064) (0.098)
LatePost 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
During X TR 1.449*** 1.449*** 1.449*** 1.449*** 1.497***
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.148)
Post X TR 0.188** 0.228** 0.197 0.228** 0.640***
(0.095) (0.114) (0.119) (0.114) (0.192)
LatePost X TR 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
During X Complied 1.787***
(0.132)
Post X Complied 0.221*
(0.118)
LatePost X Complied 0.109
(0.093)
p=1 0.579* 0.407
(0.294) (0.253)
p=2 0.842** 1.369**
(0.333) (0.569)
p=3 0.864** 0.258
(0.362) (0.218)
p=5 2.298*** 3.141***
(0.531) (0.655)
p=7 2.433*** 2.824***
(0.591) (0.783)
TR X p=1 0.391
(0.626)
TR X p=2 -1.089*
(0.621)
TR X p=3 1.162*
(0.662)
TR X p=5 -1.687*
(1.002)
TR X p=7 -0.784
(1.160)
R2 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.20
N 7,433 7,433 7,100 7,211 7,211 1,520
Subjects 111 111 111 111 111 80
Sample
All non-
coupon
weeks
All non-
coupon
weeks
Non-coupon
target
weeks
All
target
weeks
All
target
weeks
CG
Treatment Period Chow Test: .84
Post-Treatment Chow Test: .06
Notes: Observations of weekly attendance at the subject× week level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
by individual. TR denotes treated group. During, Post, and LatePost indicate, respectively, the treatment month,
the period between the treatment month and the semester break (8 weeks in column 1, 5 weeks in the remaining
columns), and the 19 weeks of observations in the following semester (excluding the semester break). Complied is
defined as attending 8 times during the treatment month. Chow tests refer to a test of equal coefficients between our
sample (column 1) and Charness and Gneezy (2009)’s sample. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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dictors of which subjects experienced a large increase in post-treatment attendance,
other than agreement with the statement “fitness is important”.
It is not surprising that we find heterogeneity in our treatment effect. One pos-
sibility, which the data cannot fully address, is that some subjects in the treatment
group merely swiped their ID cards at the gym during the treatment period and did
not actually exercise. Because such subjects would not experience a treatment ef-
fect, our estimates of the treatment effect in Table 1 would be biased towards zero
by their presence.11 The fact that any such subjects would have no treatment ef-
fect to mis-predict would also reduce the power of our test of projection bias. An
alternative explanation is that some subjects would have experienced an increase in
post-intervention attendance if the intervention period had been longer. This inter-
pretation is consistent with recent findings such as Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts and
Wardle (2010), who estimate a range of 18 to 254 days in their subjects’ time for
habit formation for various tasks. Finally, it is possible that for some subjects, a
period of induced gym attendance simply does not increase their willingness or desire
to attend the gym in the future.
Our interpretation of the treatment effect as habit formation is useful for fitting
the results into the framework of existing economic theory, but obscures important
distinctions. In the standard economic model of habit formation developed by Becker
and Murphy (1988), any increase in the marginal utility of a good or activity that re-
sults from past consumption – that is any “adjacent complementarity” in consumption
across periods – regardless of the psychological, physiological, or even social cause, is
labelled as habit formation. One possible explanation of our treatment effect is that
subjects who have not previously exercised at a gym may have systematically down-
ward biased beliefs about the net benefits of doing so, and a month of attendance
may cause them to learn the true values. Another possibility is that our treatment
effect could be the result of treated subjects forming social connections with people
they interact with at the gym, leading to an increased desire to attend the gym for
social reasons. To the extent that paying such people to go to the gym allows them to
learn the true utility of attendance, or form rewarding social connections, leading to
a persistent increase in attendance, most people would not consider the phenomenon
11As an additional robustness check, we repeat the analysis of Table 1 using card swipes at the
gym locker room rather than the front entrance. The short-run effect in this specification increases
to 0.214 (s.e. 0.075).
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to constitute habit formation, as it is commonly understood.
These distinctions matter, both for our understanding of behavior change, and
for the policy implications of our findings. If the learning story is correct, there are
alternative approaches to correcting false beliefs that might be more cost-effective
than incentives, and more feasible at the population level. Meanwhile, the social
connection story would imply that incentives need to be tied to exercise in a social
context per se as opposed to in isolation, and would suggest a range of alternative
interventions to bolster the social rewards of exercise. It is possible that incentives
might be an effective, and/or cost-effective way to increase long-term gym attendance
regardless of the underlying mechanism, but for both academic and policy reasons,
it would be valuable to understand the mechanism more fully. One might expect
that learning the true utility of gym attendance, or building social ties would persist
longer than the four weeks of winter break, but we are a long way from drawing firm
conclusions on this matter.
3.2 Short-term attendance under p-coupons
There is a growing literature suggesting that small incentives can lead to “crowding-
out” of intrinsic motivation.12 Our relatively large treatment-month incentive in-
creased treated subjects’ attendance both during and after the intervention, which,
like CG, we interpret as ruling out crowding-out both while incentives are in place
(short term) and after removal of incentives (long term). However, it is possible that
the smaller incentives of the p-coupons could lead to crowding-out. In column (4)
of Table 1, weeks in which p-coupons were actually received have been added back
into the sample, and the immediate post-treatment dummy has been interacted with
dummies for the different values of p. The coefficients for these interactions show the
increase in attendance for each level of p relative to weeks without p-coupon subsi-
dies, pooling treated and control subjects, and controlling for the difference between
treatment and control. The effect is positive, and statistically significant at the 10%
level or above, for all values of p, despite the small cell size when cutting the data so
finely. The effect is monotonically increasing in p, as predicted by standard theory.
An interesting result appears when we look at the differential effect of p-coupons
between treated and control subjects. The regression reported in column (5) of Table
12See Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) for one review.
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1 shows the difference in p-coupon effect between treatment and control groups for
each value of p. The un-interacted values of p reflect the effect of p-coupons on
control-group attendance. The pattern is qualitatively similar to the effect in the
pooled sample. The interaction terms show the difference in attendance under p-
coupons for treated subjects relative to control. These terms simultaneously capture
the short-term effect of p-coupons on treated subjects and the long-term effect of
the treatment-month incentive. The coefficients are variously positive and negative,
and none is significant above the 10% level. Only for p = 3 can we reject that the
difference between treated and control subjects in a week with coupons (i.e. we reject
that Post x TR + TR x p=3 is zero). Pooling all non-zero coupons together, we do
not reject the null that there is no relative increase for treated subjects in coupon
weeks as a whole.
It is not obvious how these results should be interpreted. Just as there is no
evidence of crowding-out from the larger treatment-month incentive among treated
subjects, so there is no evidence of crowding out from p-coupon incentives among
the control group. However, the relative increase in attendance between treatment
and control is not observed among treated subjects on weeks with a p-coupon. One
possibility is that the small incentives from the p-coupons crowded out the intrinsic
motivation recently generated by the treatment effect.13 However, we find no evi-
dence of persistent crowding out on subsequent weeks, as might be expected under
this hypothesis. Our study does not have power to explore this with any precision.
Alternatively, since the treatment effect occurred in a smaller subset of treated sub-
jects than the effect of p-coupon incentives, it may be that the combined effect of
the two in those for whom there was a treatment effect is simply drowned out in our
data.
3.3 Predictions
Next we explore the relationship between predictions and actual attendance, as well
as the relationship between first-elicitation and second-elicitation predictions. In
columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 we regress our two measures of target-week attendance
predictions — subjects’ un-incentivized predictions of attendance under p-coupon
13Another possibility is that the treatment effect and the effect of the p-coupon incentives may
simply be non-additive, in a way that shrouds their combined effect.
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subsidies, and the predictions implied by their normalized valuations of p-coupons14
— on the post-treatment dummy and dummies for values of p. We estimate:
Predictioniwt = γ1 × 2ndt + θ′piw + µi + εiwt (2)
where Predictioniwt is subject i’s predicted attendance for week w at time t.
Comparing either column to column (4) of Table 1 reveals an unambiguous pat-
tern: subjects in both groups dramatically over-predict their future gym attendance,
in both the first and second elicitations, by as much as two visits per week, for all
values of p and for weeks without p-coupons. For every level of p-coupon subsidy,
post-estimation tests reject at p < 0.01 that either prediction measure equals actual
attendance.
These results allow us to rule out, in the β, δ model of present-biased preferences,
both rational time consistency (β = 1) and fully-sophisticated present bias (β <
1, β̂ = β), both of which imply correct attendance predictions on average. Under
this interpretation, the results provide direct evidence of naivete´ in prospective gym-
attendance plans, which complements naivete´ findings of DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2006) based on procrastination in gym-contract cancelation.15
It is also worth noting in Table 2 that unincentivized predictions and normal-
ized coupon valuations are quite close for all values of p, suggesting that our two
elicitation methods are similarly valid as measures of beliefs. However, in general,
normalized valuations are lower than un-incentivized predictions. As discussed in
the design section, this undervaluation could either be caused by risk attitudes or
by the “commitment value” of p-coupons – the value of the combined short-term
cost and the long-term health-benefit of the additional attendance incentivized by
a p-coupon. To help distinguish between risk attitudes and commitment value, we
elicited a measure of risk aversion over small to moderate stakes using hypothetical
lotteries.16 We find no effect of this measure on undervaluation, suggesting it is not
driven by risk preferences. While our measure of risk aversion may simply be noisy,
14As explained in the design section, this is simply subjects’ valuations for a p-coupon divided by
the per-visit subsidy, p.
15Furthermore, while our results do not rule out a role for other models of self control such as
the temptation-utility model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004), they do suggest that such models
cannot fully explain our data, as they too embed rational expectations about choices, which is clearly
violated here.
16We use a hypothetical-stakes version of the mechanism outlined in Holt and Laury (2002).
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Table 2: Predictions of Target-Week Attendance
(Prediction) (Prediction) (Prediction) (Cpn Value) (Cpn Value) (Cpn Value)
Constant 1.573*** 1.440*** 1.333*** 3.440*** 3.450*** 3.466***
(0.120) (0.292) (0.121) (0.101) (0.321) (0.105)
p=1 1.742*** 1.854*** 2.012***
(0.150) (0.388) (0.240)
p=2 2.095*** 2.305*** 2.533*** 0.159* 0.291 0.136
(0.149) (0.407) (0.227) (0.083) (0.506) (0.135)
p=3 2.467*** 2.735*** 2.854*** 0.391*** 0.622 0.364**
(0.152) (0.442) (0.232) (0.103) (0.409) (0.183)
p=5 3.101*** 3.105*** 3.412*** 0.822*** 0.862* 0.844***
(0.172) (0.409) (0.191) (0.130) (0.446) (0.199)
p=7 3.743*** 3.927*** 4.657*** 1.300*** 1.583*** 0.919**
(0.291) (0.738) (0.418) (0.325) (0.226) (0.434)
2nd Elicitation -0.720*** -0.783*** -0.423*** -0.631*** -0.583** -0.858***
(0.111) (0.183) (0.160) (0.133) (0.226) (0.187)
TR X p=1 0.095
(0.357)
TR X p=2 -0.277 -0.015
(0.345) (0.187)
TR X p=3 -0.117 -0.031
(0.352) (0.237)
TR X p=5 -0.233 -0.170
(0.365) (0.296)
TR X p=7 -0.469 1.181
(0.872) (1.033)
TR X 2nd 0.421** 0.358
(0.209) (0.298)
TR X 2nd X p=1 -0.667*
(0.347)
TR X 2nd X p=2 -0.731** -0.316
(0.323) (0.225)
TR X 2nd X p=3 -0.650** 0.018
(0.323) (0.259)
TR X 2nd X p=5 -0.763** -0.232
(0.341) (0.307)
TR X 2nd X p=7 -1.221 -2.158*
(1.278) (1.211)
R2 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.17 0.20 0.18
N 1,088 217 1,088 875 176 875
Subjects 111 111 111 111 110 111
Sample Full 5-Wk Delay Full Full 5-Wk Delay Full
Notes: Predictions and coupon valuations at the subject × target-week × elicitation-session level. Prediction refers to
subjects’ unincentivized predictions. Cpn value refers to subjects’ valuations of p-coupons divided by the face value
of those coupons. TR is an indicatior for Treated subjects; 2nd Elicitation indicates the post-treatment elicitation
session. 5-Wk Delay sample includes only predictions for target weeks 5 weeks after each elicitation session. All
specifications include individual fixed effects and cluster standard errors by subject. p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
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this test supports the interpretation that the commitment value of a p-coupon is
negative for subjects. This would be the case for a time-consistent subject or for
a sufficiently naive present-biased subject, both of whom believe that the p-coupon
will increase their attendance only when the net marginal utility of attendance is
negative. Given that time-consistency is incompatible with systematic misprediction,
these results lend additional support to the conclusion that our subjects are naive
about their self-control problems.
In addition to the dramatic over-prediction reported above there is a striking pat-
tern of subjects revising their predictions downwards over the course of the treatment-
month. This is reflected in the coefficient on the “second-elicitation” dummy in Table
2. Predictions on average decreased by roughly three-quarters of a visit per week be-
tween the first and second elicitation meetings. These meetings differ in two ways:
first, they are separated by a month, during which subjects’ lives may have changed in
behaviorally relevant ways, and second, the second-elicitation meeting is closer in time
to each of the target weeks than the first-elicitation meeting. One possible explanation
of the downward revision in predictions between meetings is that the extent to which
subjects discount future utility (their per-period discount rate) increases smoothly
with temporal proximity, rather than abruptly as in the quasi-hyperbolic model.
Another is that subjects’ naivete´ about future self-control problems decreases with
temporal proximity. Both seem psychologically plausible. We can test for whether
either of these explanations is sufficient, because the temporal proximity of the first
elicitation to the first target week is the same as that of the second elicitation to
the fifth target week. Thus, when we restrict the regressions reported in columns (2)
and (5) to these weeks, the coefficient on the post-treatment dummy reflects only
the effect of the second elicitation being later in absolute terms than the first. The
results are virtually identical to those using the full sample of target weeks. Thus we
can rule out that temporal proximity alone explains the downward revision in predic-
tions. Rather, there appears to be an effect of the second elicitation being later than
the first elicitation in absolute terms. Running the regression using the difference
between prediction and attendance confirms that predictions are becoming more ac-
curate over time. This secular decrease in misprediction suggests that subjects may
begin the semester with incorrect beliefs about some aspect of the gym-attendance
decision. One possibility is that they are initially overly optimistic about their future
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free time, and grow more realistic once they get a few weeks into the semester.17 Any
number of alternative explanations could explain the results.
Finally, we turn our attention to whether subjects predict the post-intervention
attendance increase reported in section 3.1. To do so we begin with the assumption
that second-elicitation predictions reflect correct beliefs about the treatment effect,
because by the time of the second elicitation meeting, treatment subjects have experi-
enced the treatment effect. If treated subjects correctly foresee the ways in which the
treatment month will affect their post-treatment attendance, their predictions should
change over time in the same way as those of control subjects. Both their first- and
second-elicitation predictions will be higher than for control, so the downward re-
vision will be the same. If treated subjects fail to predict the treatment effect, we
would expect to see a smaller downward revision in their predictions, as there would
be an offsetting upward revision caused by the treatment effect becoming known.
We test for this with a series of difference-in-differences regressions of unincentivized
predictions and normalized coupon valuations.
In columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 we regress predictions on dummies for values
of p, a dummy for predictions being post- rather than pre-treatment, and the full set
of interactions of these terms with each other and with the treatment dummy. We
estimate the equation:
Predictioniwt = γ1 × 2ndt + γ2 × TRi · 2ndt + θ′1piw+
+ θ′2piw × TRi + θ′3piw × TRi × 2ndt + µi + εiwt (3)
The main effect of treatment in the pre-treatment period is absorbed by the fixed
effects. We also note that there are of course no p-coupon valuations on weeks for
which subjects were not presented with a p-coupon to value, which means that the
omitted category for unincentivized predictions in column (3) is p = 0, but for nor-
malized coupon valuations in column (6) it is p = 1.
The results in the two columns are quite similar. We begin with the unincentivized
predictions in column (3) because they provide results for weeks with and without p-
17See, e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) for why subjects may begin the semester with overly
optimistic beliefs. Another alternative would be that subjects begin the semester with high intrinsic
motivation to attend the gym, and project this enthusiasm in their beliefs about late-semester
attendance. Both would correspond to an upward shift in subjects’ first set of predictions, but our
data cannot distinguish these and other similar mechanisms.
21
coupon subsidies, and thus allow us to investigate whether the differences in treatment
effect between these weeks are mirrored in predictions. The coefficient for weeks
without p-coupon subsidies (TR x 2nd) is positive and significant, and we cannot
reject that it is identical to the estimated treatment effect effect for these weeks
reported in column (2) of Table 1, suggesting that treatment-group subjects largely
failed to predict the increased attendance caused by the treatment-month. Meanwhile,
the coefficients on Tr x 2nd x p for all positive values of p are negative and, except for
p = 7, are significant at least at the 10% level. Adding each of these coefficients to
the coefficient on the TR x 2nd dummy gives us the differential revision in predictions
between treatment and control for each value of p on weeks where p-coupon subsidies
are present. Thus unlike weeks without the extra p-coupon subsidies, we do not reject
the hypothesis that there is no differential revision in predictions between treatment
groups when p-coupon incentives are present. The same pattern can be seen in the
coefficients on the triple interaction terms in the regression of normalized coupon
valuations in column (6).
Our attempt to test misprediction of the treatment effect using an incentivized
prediction elicitation mechanism is undermined by the fact that the treatment effect
is only evidenced when there are no p-coupon incentives. However, we are encouraged
by the fact that our two prediction measures move together closely across weeks with
and without p-coupons. Taken together, our results for attendance and unincentivized
prediction appear to be consistent with the idea that treated subjects failed to foresee
the increased attendance caused by the treatment month, while because there was
no increase in attendance on weeks for which they held a p-coupon, their treatment-
effect predictions appear correct because there was essentially no treatment effect for
them to mis-predict. This is consistent with a model of projection bias over habit
formation, a` la Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003), but there are certainly
other possibilities. For example, subjects may have had correct beliefs about habit
formation per se, but failed to predict that they would attend the gym enough to form
a habit during the treatment month. Another possibility is that the treatment effect
was caused not by habit formation, but by one of the alternative causes mentioned in
section 3.1, i.e. treated subjects either learning the true utility of gym attendance, or
generating utility from social contacts at the gym. In either case our results suggest
that they did not predict the effect.
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4 Discussion
Using a field-experimental intervention to exogenously shift preferences toward gym-
attendance in a student sample, we find systematic evidence consistent with two
simultaneous dimensions of misprediction: projection bias with respect to habit for-
mation, and naivete´ with respect to present bias. We develop a novel tool for eliciting
predictions which serves both to incentivize subjects’ predictions and to shift their
actual future behavior, allowing us to explore both their attendance predictions, and
the value they place on incentives for future attendance, as well as the effect of small
incentives. We find that our 8-visit intervention raised post-treatment attendance
among treated subjects by approximately 0.2 visits per week in the immediate post-
treatment period. This relative increase in attendance did not persist after the hiatus
in attendance created by the winter break. The difference-in-differences in treated and
control subjects’ first- and second-elicitation predictions reveals a significant relative
increase in predicted attendance of 0.4 visits per week in those weeks without p-
coupon subsidies, which is not distinguishable from the actual change in attendance.
Finally, subjects in general predicted roughly 1-2 visits more than they ultimately
made.
Under the strong assumptions needed to model these results formally as habit
formation, projection bias, and partially naive present bias, it is possible to derive
and estimate a structural model to recover the parameters associate with the relevant
models. We follow this approach in a previous working version of this paper, Acland
and Levy (2013). Under the assumption that agents have quasi-linear utility in money,
disutility from gym attendance, and the long-run health benefits of gym attendance,
we find that the habit reported in this paper corresponds to a monetary value of
$2.60.18 In contrast, subjects only predicted a habit of $0.16, corresponding to a
degree of projection bias of α = 0.94 in the model of Loewenstein et al. (2003).
Subjects’ general over-optimism regarding gym attendance corresponds to a degree
of naivete regarding present bias of 0.67 – that is, for example, if subjects have a
short-run discount factor β = 0.7 in the Laibson (1997) model, they believe all future
selves will instead have a short-run discount factor βˆ = 0.9.
We believe that our results can help explain several features of contracts typical
18That is, the extra consumption utility of gym attendance when in a habituated state is equivalent
to a $2.60 external subsidy.
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in gym markets. Our results provide one explanation for the prevalence of unlimited
pre-paid gym contracts rather than pay-per-visit memberships or the “commitment
contracts” often suggested as a remedy for present bias. Following DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004), firms will provide contracts for investment goods such as exer-
cise that feature below marginal cost per-use prices, either because of sophisticated
consumers’ demand for commitment or to obtain the rents from naive consumers’
“fictitious surplus” caused by over-optimistic beliefs. We provide direct evidence that
it is the latter effect that appears to drive consumer behavior, albeit in our highly
selected sample.19
Moreover, our findings suggest an explanation for the dearth of contracts replicat-
ing the habit-formation intervention used here and by Charness and Gneezy (2009).
Both papers find that such an intervention can help people develop positive exercise
habits, at least in the short run, and in principle this could be marketed by firms.
That our subjects failed to predict the increase in gym-attendance caused by the
intervention means that there is likely to be little demand for such a contract.20 The
effect is magnified by subjects’ naivete, as they do not value the effect an exercise
habit would have in balancing their future selves’ self-control problems. Employers
or policymakers seeking to provide incentives for increased physical activity are thus
constrained in the offerings that will be deemed valuable, and this problem plau-
sibly extends beyond the gym. Contracts which use the over-estimation of future
gym attendance to raise the cost of immediate misbehavior – for example, allowing
individuals to choose a target level of attendance with rewards for matching it and
penalties for missing – are likely to be particularly effective.
We acknowledge there are, of course, other potential interpretations for these two
prediction failures. For example, the failure of treated subjects to predict the treat-
ment effect could be explained if subjects entered the experiment with systematically
biased beliefs about the desirability of gym attendance, and subsequently only treated
subjects learned that it was more pleasant (or less unpleasant) than their prior. Or,
treated subjects may have formed rewarding social contacts at the gym during the
19DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) show that infrequent gym-users choose contracts with prices
that are apparently dominated ex-post, but point out that plan choice is consistent with either
sophisticated or naive consumers, and instead establish their naivete´ result using procrastination in
plan cancelation.
20It is telling that the increasingly popular “fitness boot camps,” which offer participants several
weeks of intense training, tend to advertise their product as providing immediate benefits such as
weight loss rather than as creating a lasting exercise habit.
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treatment month, making future attendance more desirable for social reasons. How-
ever, any alternative must require that treated subjects initially held incorrect beliefs,
and will have largely similar welfare implications: individuals will underinvest in ben-
eficial activities for which an initial period of attendance leads to a persistent increase
in future attendance.
A model of projection bias over habit state predicts that habituated subjects will
also mis-predict the decay of the treatment effect. If de-habituation is sufficiently
rapid – as our data suggest may be true in our setting – projection bias with respect
to habit decay might cause individuals to underinvest in maintaining a habit once it
has been formed. It is possible that learning about the true utility of gym attendance,
or the value of social contacts at the gym, could decay rapidly over a span of a few
weeks, but this seems less plausible than the decay of habit formation. It is possible
that further research could help to fully disentangle our projection-bias interpretation
from alternatives by eliciting predictions of attendance over a period of habit decay.
References
Acland, Dan and Matthew R Levy, “Naivete, Projection Bias, and Habit Forma-
tion in Gym Attendance,” http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2233004 2013.
Be´nabou, Roland and Jean Tirole, “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2002, 117 (3), 871–915.
Charness, Gary and Uri Gneezy, “Incentives to Exercise,” Econometrica, May
2009, 77 (3), 909–931.
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier, “Contract Design and Self-
Control: Theory and Evidence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May
2004, 119 (2), 353–402.
and , “Paying Not To Go To The Gym,” The American Economic Review,
June 2006, 96 (3), 694–719.
Dzewaltowski, David, John Noble, and Jeff Shaw, “Physical activity participa-
tion: social cognitive theory versus the theories of reasoned action and planned
behavior,” Sport Psychology, December 1990, 12 (4), 388–405.
Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel, “When and Why Incentives
(Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2011, 25
(4), 1–21.
Godin, Gaston, “Theories of reasoned action and planned behavior: usefulness for
exercise promotion,” Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise, November
1994, 26 (11), 1391–1394.
25
, Pierre Valois, and Linda Lepage, “The pattern of influence of perceived
behavioral control upon exercising behavior: An application of Ajzen’s theory of
planned behavior,” Journal of Behavioural Medicine, 1993, 16 (1), 81–102.
Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “Temptation and Self-Control,” Econo-
metrica, November 2001, 69 (6), 1403–1435.
and , “Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption,” Econometrica, Jan-
uary 2004, 72 (1), 119–158.
Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury, “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects,”
The American Economic Review, 2002, 92 (5), 1644–1655.
Kane, Robert, Paul Johnson, Robert Town, and Mary Butler, “A Struc-
tured Review of the Effect of Economic Incentives on Consumers’ Preventive
Behavior,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 2004, 27 (4).
Laibson, David, “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1997, 112 (2), 443–477.
Lally, Phillppa, Cornelia H. M. van Jaarsveld, Henry W. W. Potts, and
Jane Wardle, “How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real
world,” European Journal of Social Psychology, 2010, 40 (6), 998–1109.
Loewenstein, George, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, “Projection
Bias in Predicting Future Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, March
2003, 118 (4), 1209–1248.
O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin, “Doing It Now or Later,” The American
Economic Review, March 1999, 89 (1), 103–124.
Reynolds, Kim, Joel Killen, Susan Bryson, David Maron, C. Barr Taylor,
Nathan Maccoby, and John Farquhar, “Psychosocial predictors of physical
activity in adolescents,” Preventive Medicine, September 1990, 19 (5), 541–551.
Valois, Pierre, Raymond Dersharnais, and Gaston Godin, “A comparison of
the Fishbein and Ajzen and tbe Triandis attitudinal models for the prediction
of exercise intention and behavior,” Journal of Behavioural Medicine, 1988, 11
(5), 459–472.
26
A Appendix
A.1 Sample
Our initial sample consisted of 120 subjects, randomly assigned to treatment and
control groups of 60 subjects each. Table A.1 provides a comparison of the treatment
and control groups. Due to attrition and missing data the final number of treated
subjects in our analysis is 54 and of control subjects 57. In addition to basic demo-
graphic variables we included discretionary budget and the time and money cost of
getting to campus in order to control for differences in the cost of gym attendance
and the relative value of monetary incentives. The pre-treatment Godin Activity
Scale is a self-reported measure of physical activity in a typical week prior to the
treatment. The self-reported importance of physical fitness and physical appearance
were included as a proxy for subjects’ taste for the outcomes typically associated
with gym-attendance. The naivete proxy covariates are subjects’ answers to a series
of unincentivized questions as follows:
Variable Question
Forget I often forget appointments or plans that I’ve made, so
that I either miss them, or else have to rearrange my
plans at the last minute.
Spontaneous I often do things spontaneously without planning.
Things come up I often have things come up in my life that cause me to
change my plans.
Think ahead I typically think ahead carefully, so I have a pretty good
idea what I’ll be doing in a week or a month.
Procrastinate I usually want to do things I like right away, but put off
things that I don’t like.
A.2 Compliance, attrition, and randomization.
To mitigate attrition over our three sessions we gave subjects two participation pay-
ments of $25 each, in addition to the various gym-attendance offers. The first payment
was for attendance at the first session. The second payment required attendance at
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both the second and third sessions.21 Despite this titration of rewards, six of the
120 subjects did not complete the study. Two control subjects and two treatment
subjects left the study between the first and second sessions, and two more treatment
subjects left between the second and third. In order to include an additional handful
of subjects who were not able to make the third session, and otherwise would have
left the study, we held make-up sessions the following day. Four control subjects and
two treatment subjects attended these sessions and we have treated them as having
completed the study.
A comparison of compliers and non-compliers with the treatment month incentive
among treated subjects appears in columns (5) and (6) of Table A.1.
A.3 Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Individual-Level Habits
0
10
20
30
40
Pe
rc
en
t
-1 0 1 2 3
habit
Treated Control
Notes: Individual level habit effects, by treatment assignment. Habits are individual changes in
attendance during the immediate post-treatment period, and are analogous to the group-level
habits estimated in Table 1
21Gym-attendance offers were not tied to attendance because this would have created a differential
between the treatment and control groups in the incentive to complete the study.
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B For Online Publication
B.1 Screening mechanism and Randomization
The webpage we used to screen for non-attenders is shown below. We included three
“dummy” questions to make it harder for subjects to return to the site and change
their answers in order to be able to join the experiment. Despite this precaution, a
handful of subjects did return to the screening site and modify their answers until
they hit upon the correct answer to join the experiment. (Which was a “no” on
question four.) Out of a total of 497 unique IP addresses in our screening log, we
found 5 instances of subjects possibly gaming the system to gain access to the study.
We have no way to determine if these subjects wound up in our subject pool.
Randomizing subjects into treatment and control presented some challenges. Our
design required that treatment and control subjects meet separately. For each of the
three sessions we scheduled four timeslots, back-to-back, and staggered them between
Control and Treatment. When subjects responded to the online solicitation, and after
they had completed the screening questionnaire, they were randomly assigned to
either treatment or control and were then asked to choose between the two timeslots
allocated to their assigned group. Subjects who could not find a timeslot that fit
their schedule voluntarily left the study at this point.22 As it turned out, subjects
assigned to the treatment group were substantially less likely to find a timeslot that
worked for them, and as a result the desired number of subjects were successfully
enrolled in the control group well before the treatment group was filled. Wanting to
preserve the balanced number of Treatment and Control subjects, maintain power
to identify heterogeneity within the Treatment group, and stay within the budget
for the study, we capped the control group and continued to solicit participants in
order to fill the treatment group. Subjects who responded to the solicitation after the
Control group was filled were randomly assigned to treatment or control, and those
assigned to control were then thanked and told that the study was full. Our treatment
group therefore includes subjects who were either solicited later, or responded to the
solicitation later than any of the subjects in the control group.23
22Technically they were considered to have never joined the study, and received no payment.
23Additionally, the two groups of subjects were available at different times of day. To the extent
that what made it hard for Treatment subjects to find a timeslot that fit the schedule may have
been correlated with gym-attendance behavior (if, for example, the Treatment timeslots happen to
have coincided with the most preferred times for non-gym exercise), then the group averages for
30
Figure B.2: Screening Site
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To the extent that these temporal differences are correlated with any of the be-
haviors we are studying, simple comparisons of group averages may be biased. It
appears, however, that the two groups are not substantially different along any of
the dimensions we observed in our dataset, as a joint F-test does reject that the two
groups were randomly selected from the same population based on observables. A
comparison of the two groups appears in Table A.1.
We are able to examine the pre-experimental gym-attendance history of our sub-
jects, and conclude that the screening mechanism was largely effective. Out of 120
subjects, only 4 (3.3%) visited the RSF at least once a week on average in the pre-
experimental period, and none visited twice a week (i.e. the level of attendance in
our intervention). Just over half of subjects never visited the RSF at all during the
pre-experimental period.
Table B.2 compares subjects who attended at least one time in the 37-week pre-
treatment period with those who did not. There are a handful of significant dif-
ferences: those with non-zero pre-treatment attendance are younger, more likely to
be female, and have lower travel time and cost (e.g. live on campus). These are
unsurprising predictors of gym attendance. Race-Asian is marginally significant, sug-
gesting that there could be cultural differences among race categories regarding the
desirability of gym attendance (it is not significant in a regression that includes the
other characteristics). We use individual fixed effects in all our regressions to adjust
for these differences. As mentioned in the text, there is no significant difference in the
proportion of pre-attenders between treatment and control. There is also no differ-
ence in the proportion between compliers and non-compliers (p=0.77). Pre-treatment
attendance is also not correlated with habit-formation (p=0.46).
B.2 Elicitation mechanisms
Figure B.3 depicts the sample p-coupon and instructions that subjects saw to prepare
them for the incentive-compatible elicitation task. Verbal instructions given at this
time further clarified exactly what we were asking subjects to do. Note that the sure-
thing values in column A are increments of $P . The line number where subjects cross
over from choosing column B to choosing column A bounds their valuation for the
p-coupon. We used a linear interpolation between these bounds to create our “BDM”
some outcome variables may be biased.
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Table B.2: Comparison of Subjects with and without pre-treatment attendance
(1) (2) (3)
No Previous Attendance Some Previous Attendance T-test p-value
Demographic covariates
Age 23.463 20.456 0.01
(1.132) (0.297)
Gender (1=female) 0.611 0.754 0.011
(0.067) (0.058)
Proportion white 0.444 0.281 0.074
(0.068) (0.060)
Proportion Asian 0.463 0.649 0.049
(0.068) (0.064)
Proportion other race 0.093 0.070 0.669
(0.040) (0.034)
Economic covariates
Discretionary budget 170.370 213.158 0.251
(23.993) (28.029)
Travel cost to campus 1.750 0.096 0.002
(0.535) (0.066)
Travel time to campus (min) 17.500 11.974 0.009
(1.976) (0.786)
Naivete proxy covariates
Forgeta,b 1.574 1.614 0.767
(0.094) (0.096)
Spontaneousa,b 2.481 2.491 0.951
(0.120) (0.104)
Things come upa,b 2.519 2.649 0.366
(0.108) (0.095)
Think aheada,b 2.833 2.912 0.583
(0.105) (0.098)
Procrastinatea,b 3.074 3.000 0.622
(0.109) (0.103)
Exercise experience and attitude covariates
Pre-trt Godin Activity Scale 37.991 34.211 0.429
(3.541) (3.198)
Fitness is importanta,b 3.056 3.105 0.115
(0.081) (0.082)
Appearance is importanta,b 3.333 3.175 0.129
(0.092) (0.091)
N 54 57
F-test of joint significance 0.007
Notes: a 1= Disagree Strongly, 2=Disagree Somewhat; 3=Agree Somewhat;
4=Agree Strongly. b Wording of questions in appendix. Standard errors in paren-
theses. Pre-attendance is defined as having any attendance in the 37 weeks prior
to the treatment.
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variable. Thus, for example, if a subject chose B at and below line four, and then
chose A at and above line five we assigned them a p-coupon valuation of $P × 4.5 In
general subjects appear to have understood this task clearly. There were only three
subjects who failed to display a single crossing on every task, and all of them appear
to have realized what they were doing before the end of the first elicitation session.
The observations for which these three subjects did not display a single crossing have
been dropped from our analysis.
By randomly choosing only one target week for only one subject we maintain
incentive compatibility while leaving all but one subject per session actually holding
a p-coupon, and for only one target week. This is important because what we care
about is the change in their valuation of a p-coupon from first to second elicitation
sessions. Subjects who are already holding a coupon from the first session would
be valuing a second coupon in the second session, making their valuations poten-
tially incomparable, rather like comparing willingness-to-pay for a first candy bar to
willingness-to-pay for a second candy bar.
The instructions and example for the unincentivized prediction task and the task
for prediction of other people’s attendance appear as figure B.4.
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Figure B.3: Sample p-coupon and incentive-compatible elicitation task
[PRACTICE] 
 
This exercise involves nine questions, relating to the Daily RSF-Reward Certificate shown at the top of 
the page.  Each question gives you two options, A or B.  For each question check the option you prefer.   
You will be asked to complete this exercise four times, once each for four of the five target weeks.  The 
daily value of the certificate will be different for each of these four target weeks.  For one of the five 
weeks you will not be asked to complete this exercise. 
At the end of the session I’ll choose one of the five target weeks at random.  Then I’ll choose one of the 
nine questions at random.  Then I’ll choose one subject at random.  The randomly chosen subject will 
receive whichever option they checked on the randomly chosen question for the randomly chosen 
target week.  Thus, for each question it is in your interest to check the option you prefer. 
 
 
 
For each question, check which option you prefer, A or B. 
 
 Option A  Option B 
 1. Would you prefer  
$1 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 2. Would you prefer  
$2 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 3. Would you prefer  
$3 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 4. Would you prefer  
$4 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 5. Would you prefer  
$5 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 6. Would you prefer  
$6 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 7. Would you prefer  
$7 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 8. Would you prefer  
$8 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
 9. Would you prefer  
$9 for certain,  
paid Monday, Oct 20. or  
The Daily RSF-Reward Certificate  
shown above. 
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Figure B.4: Unincentivized and other elicitation tasks
 [PRACTICE] 
 
For each target week you will also be asked to complete the following two exercises.  Both of these 
exercises relate to the Daily RSF-Reward Certificate shown at the top of the page, which is the same as 
the one shown at the top of the preceding page.  In addition, there will be one target week for which 
you will be shown no certificate, and you will be asked to complete only these last two exercises. 
 
 
 
 
Imagine that you have just been given the Daily RSF-Reward Certificate shown above, and that this is 
the only certificate you are going to receive from this experiment. 
 
How many days would you attend the RSF that week if you had been given that certificate? ______ 
 
 
 
 
Now imagine that everyone in the room except you has just been given the Daily RSF-Reward Certificate 
shown above, and that this is the only certificate they are going to receive from this experiment. 
What do you think would be the average number of days the other people in the room (not including 
you) would go to the RSF that week? _______  
(Your answer does not have to be a round number.  It can be a fraction or decimal.)  
 
Notes: As part of this experiment some subjects will receive real certificates. 
 I will give a $10 prize to the subject whose answer to this exercise is closest to the correct, 
average RSF-attendance for subjects (other than themselves) who receive the certificate 
shown above.  The prize money will be paid by check, mailed on Monday,.Oct 20. 
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